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Electoral systems are significant in determining the structure of
electorates
Analysing a vast database of district level election results,  Gudio Tiemann shows the political consequences of
electoral systems at the district level,  concentrating on the effects of (local) district magnitudes on the
fragmentation of (local) electorates and  the context-dependency of electoral system effects. The straightforward
focus on the district level addresses  where the causal forces behind Duverger’s law actually operate and exploit
rich datasets that have only recently been made available for empirical analyses. 
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Bottom-Up: Providing the Societal Demand for Candidates or Political Parties
The sociological perspective has traced back the nature and number of candidates or political parties to the type
and the number of substantial cleavages in a society. However, authors who suggest a more actor-centred
perspective have contested these notions and, following Mancur Olson, has sharply criticized the apparent believe
that social interests will somehow automatically organise in political parties for ignoring imminent collective action
problems which may, among other sources, arise from the institutional context.
Top-Down: Limiting Party Proliferation and Establishing an Upper Bound
Gary W. Cox has picked up earlier arguments enshrined in “Duverger’s Law”. His formal modelling suggests that
in each single member plurality district (M=1) there will be only two vote-getting candidates in a game-theoretic
equilibrium. Subsequently, Cox extends his arguments to multi-member districts (M>1). He suggests that there
may be no more than M+1 viable candidates in each district of the magnitude M. This proposition, labelled the
“M+1 rule”, is the central building block of Cox’ contribution to the analysis of electoral systems. The formal
statement does not imply any unconditional comparative statics of electoral systems, but in contrast con‐
ceptualises institutional constraints as erecting an upper limit or a carrying capacity for the number of viable
candidates or lists in a game-theoretic equilibrium.
Single-Tier and Multi-Tier Districting
Whether these district magnitudes are actually binding depends on the district structure. In single-tier systems,
when only “primary” districts are present, district magnitude as specified by the M+1 rule may be binding.
Parliamentary seats can only be won and lost within each of the individual districts, and both voters and party
elites need to react to the institutional incentives.
In contrast, if the primary districts are grouped into “secondary” districts, the impact of the M+1 rule might easily
be watered down since voters and political elites might support lists or candidates which are out of the running in
the primary districts in order to potentially win a seat in one of the secondary, upper-tier districts.
Data
There has often been an asymmetry of electoral system theories, which focused on the district level, and the
availability of reliable empirical information that was regularly only accessible for the national level. One of the
most exhaustive datasets has been published by Daniele Caramani (2000), who compiled systematic and
standardized district-level general election results, where available, for 18 West European countries from as early
as 1830 until the end of the twentieth century.
In this study, I draw heavily on this rich database, but I settle on the interval from 1945 to 1998 in order to obtain
parallel, synchronous observations taken from as many countries as possible. In this period, detailed district level
data is available for 169 elections to the respective national parliaments. Thus, the dataset comprises 17,248
electoral districts. This number includes 14,152 single-member districts in Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom
and 3,096 multi-member districts in Austria, Belgium, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. The dataset has, where available, been care‐
fully augmented by information on district magnitude, several other electoral system features and national-level
information regarding social heterogeneity from a variety of sources.
The Empirics of Party Supply and Demand
I begin the presentation of the results with some simple bivariate evidence which does not straightforwardly relate
to the M+1 rule, but rather adopts the inductive perspective embodied in the “generalized Duverger’s law”. Figure
1 summarizes these findings graphically and provides some additional checks on the association of the number of
candidates or parties and its specific functional form: the thick line indicates the logarithmic mapping of effective
magnitude upon the effective number of electoral parties, the thin dashed lines show the respective confidence
intervals (all printed in grey).
The diagram displays another model so as to facilitate specification checks: instead of treating logged effective
magnitude as a continuous predictor, I break district magnitude down into a series of dummy variables (1≤M≤58).
The vertical error bars capture the effect of district magnitude on the effective number of parties and the related
confidence intervals (all printed in black). Both specifications produce almost identical results, at least as long as
district magnitudes are small.
Figure 1
Figure 2 explores the context dependency of electoral systems in more detail. The effect of local district
magnitudes on the fragmentation of local electorates, as indicated by the random slope on logged effective
magnitude, significantly varies by election and by country. Each of the lines captures predictions for the marginal
effects of district magnitude. Flat regression profiles refer to the absence of electoral system effects and number
of candidates or lists is about the same in small and in large districts. Steep profiles indicate that strong marginal
effects and district magnitudes may potentially be binding. In this case, small district magnitudes are linked with
low, and large magnitudes are linked with high numbers of electoral parties.
Figure 2
This allows us to shed some light on the political consequences of effective magnitude: In the first group of
countries, there is a particularly steep slope indicating a significant marginal effect of local district magnitudes on
electoral fragmentation. This is clearly visible in countries that are comparatively more heterogeneous in ethnic
and religious terms and/or have implemented single-tier P.R. systems. Countries like Finland, Ireland, and
Switzerland and, somewhat less clearly, Portugal and Spain fall into that category.
The second cluster of countries also unambiguously reveals significant marginal effects, but these are somewhat
weaker or unstable across repeated elections: Belgium, Italy, and Luxembourg.
In a final cluster of countries, there is only limited evidence for the marginal effects of district magnitude. Almost
flat predictions for the election-specific regression profiles indicate that institutional incentives are obviously not
effective and/or binding. This refers to countries which are either socially homogeneous and/or have implemented
more complicated P.R. electoral systems with upper tiers and vote or seat transfers such as Austria, Iceland,
Norway, or Sweden.
When evaluating whether district magnitude becomes binding, the analytical scope cannot be limited to the supply
side given by the electoral system, but also needs to consider the demand side given by the number of societal
groups, which organize into political parties and strive for representation in parliament. An extensive database on
ethnic and religious fragmentation provides the principal indicators for social heterogeneity.
Figure 3 provides evidence in favour of the joint supply and demand model and displays the predictions derived
from the multilevel models. Regarding ethnic (the left-hand panel) and religious diversity (the right-hand panel),
the marginal effects of district magnitude are substantively stronger in heterogeneous than in homogeneous
countries. The marginal effect of ethnic heterogeneity seems to be somewhat more meaningful and robust than
the consequences of religious diversity. These arguments conform to the analytical concept of the M+1 rule in a
more straightforward manner. Effective magnitude becomes binding when there is a high number of groups form‐
ing parties and contesting the elections; in contrast, the marginal effects of district magnitude are much weaker in
more homogeneous countries where the proliferation of candidates or parties will often be below the carrying
capacity established by the electoral rules from the outset.
Figure 3
The Effects of Upper Tiers
The provision of upper tiers may render local district magnitudes less binding and the M+1 rule less applicable or
invalid. Figure 4 illustrates the model predictions. Controlling for social heterogeneity, the number of candidates or
lists visibly increases with district magnitudes if there are only primary electoral districts, and local district
magnitudes thus tend to be binding. In contrast, the effects of district magnitude almost completely diminish when
we focus on those electoral systems that do employ secondary (or even tertiary) districts. In the presence of upper
tiers, the local number of candidates or parties in small and in large districts is almost the same.
Figure 4
Summary and Conclusion
Any generalisation of a well-established hypothesis, most notably the proposition of a “Law”, suggests the very
impression of scientific progress. While the strategy of gross national-level generalisation seems to be exhausted
and does not provide any new insight, sophisticated research based on district-level data, for instance the growing
literature on mixed-member electoral systems, is too often confined to single-case studies yielding heavily
context-dependent results and almost no scope for systematic generalization.
The empirical results underscore both the significance of electoral systems for the structure of (local) electorates
and their profound context-dependency:
(1) district magnitude only becomes binding when a high social demand meets a low carrying capacity of the
electoral district;(2) the magnitude of primary electoral districts only tends to be binding when the electoral
structure provides no upper tiers or allocates only a very limited share of seats in the upper tiers.
—
To see the West European Politics journal blog that this piece is based on, click here . 
Note: This post represents the views of the author and not Democratic Audit or the LSE. Please read our
comments policy before posting.
—
Guido Tiemann is Assistant Professor of Comparative European Politics, Institute for
Advanced Studies Vienna
 
